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"[T]he strongest weapon against hateful speech is not repression;
it is more speech-the voices of tolerance that rally against bigotry
... , and lift up ... mutual respect."
-President
"In the end, we will remember
the silence of our friends."

Barack Obama

not the words of our enemies, but
-Martin

Luther King, Jr.

"[H]ardly any of the voices that should have been raised in moral
protest against Nazism were to be heard in Germany or the territo-

ries conquered by the Reich. Where political and religious leaders
did speak out against the Nazis, notably in ... Denmark, most Jews
were saved. Those Jews who died ... were victims of the silence of
Europe's moral leadership as they were victims of the Nazis."
-Aryeh Neier, ACLU executive director
during the Skokie litigation
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Introduction

As WE FACE the challenge of countering ever-more-prevalent discriminatory and divisive attitudes and actions in our society, the
Word "hate" has been increasingly prominent in our political discourse. As experience teaches, anyone can be both accused of and
~ubjected to "hatred" based on a wide range of personal characteristics and beliefs. The terms "hate speech" and "hate crimes" are
u.sed to demonize and to call for punishing a broad array of expression, including political discourse that is integral to our democracy.
. The term "hate speech" is not a legal term of art, with a speci~c definition; rather, it is deployed to stigmatize and to suppress
Widelyvarying expression. The most generally understood meaning
0:
"hate speech" is expression that conveys hateful or discriminatory
Views against specific individuals or groups, particularly those who
have historically faced discrimination.
t Beyond this core meaning, many people have hurled the epih~t "hate speech" against a diverse range of messages that they
reiect, including messages about many important public policy
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issues. Moreover, too much rhetoric equates "hate speech" with
violent criminal conduct. On many campuses, for example, students complain that they have been "assaulted" when they are
exposed to ideas that offend them, or even if they learn that
a provocative speaker has been invited to campus. This false
equation between controversial ideas and physical violence fuels
unwarranted calls for outlawing and punishing ideas, along with
violence.
To be sure, campuses and other arenas in our society must strive
to be inclusive, to make everyone welcome, especially those who
traditionally have been excluded or marginalized. But that inclusiviry must also extend to those who voice unpopular ideas, especially
on campus, where ideas should be most freely aired, discussed, and
debated. Encountering "unwelcome" ideas, including those that are
hateful and discriminatory, :ts essential for hottinl'our abilities to
analyze, criticize, and refute them. On that point, I would like to
invoke the inaugural convocation address by Ruth Simmons, Brown
University's president from 2001 to 2012, the first African-American
president of any Ivy League university, and Brown's first female
president:
You know something that I hate? When people say, "That doesn't
make me feel good about myself." I say, "That's not what you're
here for." ... I believe that learning at its best is the antithesis
of comfort. [l]f you come to this [campus] for comfort, I would
urge you to walk [through] yon iron gate.... But if you seek
betterment for yourself, for your community and posterity, stay
and fight.
Discussions about "hate speech" have been clouded by conclusory condemnations, conflating many kinds of expression and action.
Instead, we must draw critical distinctions between ideas that are
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disfavored, disturbing, or feared, which should be protected, and
actions that are discriminatory or violent, which should be punished.
My mission in this work is to refute the argument that the United
States, following the lead of many other nations, should adopt a
broad concept of illegal "hate speech," and to demonstrate why such
a course would not only violate fundamental precepts of our democracy but also do more harm than good.

THE ESSENTIAL DISTINCTION
AND PUNISHABLE

BETWEEN PROTECTED

"HATE SPEECH"

Debates about these issues are often marred by widespread confusion about the governing free speech principles. Too many people, including even some lawyers, wrongly assert that under our
Constitution "hate speech" is either absolutely protected or completely unprotected. Neither statement is accurate.
On the one hand, many who argue that we should revise our
law to empower government to punish "hate speech" wrongly
assume that such speech is now absolutely protected. In support
~f their proposals, they cite many examples of speech that already
ts subject to sanction in the United States, consistent with longstanding free speech principles. For example, they regularly point
to speech that constitutes a genuine threat or targeted harasslllent, and thus directly causes specific imminent serious harm,
lllaking it already punishable consistent with the emergency
Principle.
On the other hand, too many people wrongly assert that "hate
speech is not free speech," assuming that speech with a hateful message is automatically excluded from First Amendment protection.
Consistent with the cardinal viewpoint neutrality principle, however,
government may not punish "hate speech" (or speech conveying any
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particular point of view) merely because some of us-even the vast
majority of us-consider its views or ideas objectionable or even
abhorrent. For that reason, no matter what adjective we might use
to excoriate speech whose ideas we disfavor-including "hateful,"
"abusive," "unwelcome," "offensive," "dangerous," or "violent" (to
cite some epithets that are invoked by advocates of suppressing the
designated speech)-such disfavor alone does not warrant censoring
the speech.
Moreover, speech may not be censored because its message might
have a disturbing impact on the hearts or minds of some audience
members. Viewpoint-based restrictions pose the greatest danger to
the core value underlying the First Amendment: our right as individuals to make our own choices about what ideas we choose to express,
receive, and believe. Because they distort public debate, viewpointbased regulations are also antithetical to our democratic political system. Additionally, they violate equality principles because,
reflecting majoritarian political pressures, they generally target
unpopular, minority, and dissenting views and speakers. Censorship
of "hate speech" is also unjustified by the speech's feared harmful
tendency: the generalized fear that it might indirectly contribute to
future negative conduct by some people who hear or read it.
These speech-protective precepts are not based on a presumption that speech cannot cause harm. To the contrary, we cherish
speech precisely because of its unique capacity to influence us, both
positively and negatively. But even though speech can contribute
to potential harms, it would be more harmful to both individuals
and society to empower the government to suppress speech for that
reason, except consistent with the emergency and viewpoint neutrality principles. This book substantiates that conclusion with man)'
examples from many different countries.
The Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed the foregoing First
Amendment principles in a 2011 case in which it upheld the
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right of individuals to engage
sive speech: picketing outside
with signs conveying hateful
Catholics, the pope, and gay
explained:

in extremely, hurtful and offenthe funerals of military veterans
views about military personnel,
men and lesbians. As the Court

Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to
tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great
pain. [W]e cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.
As a Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even
hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle
public debate.

The Court's near-unanimity in this case is noteworthy, and typical of its free speech rulings. In recent decades, the Court has been
closely divided ideologically, often splitting 5-4 on other constitutional controversies. But justices across the ideological spectrum
have consistently been united by strong support for the core freedom of speech principles, even when the speech conveys hateful
and hated views.
This robust understanding of our First Amendment should
likewise transcend partisan divides in our political sphere, because
the underlying principles protect all speakers-and all audience
members-whatever our views, and whoever we are. That critical
point was stressed in the midst of the civil rights movement by a
1961 New York court ruling that upheld the free speech rights of an
American Nazi to convey racist ideas, consistent with the viewpoint
neutrality and emergency principles. The judge explained that these
principles also redounded to the benefit of the civil rights activists
who were conveying precisely the opposite, antiracist ideas, and
who consistently were threatened with censorship in communities

[sl
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where their ideas were despised and feared, including the many campuses that excluded them:
[T]he unpopularity of views, ... their obnoxiousness
is not
enough [to justify suppressing them]. Otherwise, the
antiracist ... could be suppressed, if he undertakes to speak in
"restricted" areas; and one who asks that public schools be
open indiscriminately to all ethnic groups could be lawfully
suppressed, if only he choose to speak where persuasion is
needed most.
The fact that "hate speech" laws inevitably endanger views
across the political spectrum is confirmed by recent experience
under such laws in European countries. In a September 2017
essay, entitled "In Europe, Hate Speech Laws Are Often Used
to Suppress and Punish Left-Wing Viewpoints," journalist Glenn
Greenwald writes:
Many Americans who long for Europe's hate speech restrictions
assume that those laws are used to outlaw and punish expression of the bigoted ideas they most hate: racism, homophobia,
Islamophobia, misogyny. Often, such laws are used that way....
But hate speech restrictions ... in those countries ... have frequently been used to constrain and sanction a wide range of
political views that many left-wing censorship advocates would
never dream could be deemed "hateful," and even against opinions which many of them likely share.
If we allowed government to suppress speech that might exert
a negative influence on our minds or actions, then no speech would
be safe. As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared
in a landmark 1919 dissent, in which he strongly repudiated the

[ 6]

INTRODUCTION

majority's bad tendency doctrine, "Every idea· is an incitement."
He did not mean by this statement that government may therefore
suppress every idea, but rather the opposite: that government may
suppress speech only when it directly causes specific, imminent,
and serious harm.
As history teaches, permitting the government to punish speech
based on any lesser connection between the speech and the feared
harm would be a license for witch hunts-literally, as well as figuratively. Justice Louis Brandeis reminded us of this danger in his 1927
opinion in Whitneyv. California,which Justice Holmes joined. After
rejecting the majority's bad tendency standard, and its conclusion
that the government could constitutionally punish Socialist Party
activist Anita Whitney because her socialist advocacy might lead
to "terrorism and violence," Brandeis wrote: "Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech .... Men feared
witches and burnt women." Accordingly, he articulated the highly
speech-protective emergency standard that the Court finally unanimously endorsed in 1969: "Only an emergency can justify repression." Brandeis added that if the message's potential danger does
nor rise to the level of an emergency, the proper response is "more
speech, not enforced silence."
The "hate speech" laws that many other countries now enforce,
which license government to punish speech solely because its messa ge .is dits favored, disturbing, or feared, too often are enforced to
suppress today's counterparts of Anita Whitney: those who express
unpopular, dissenting views. It would hardly constitute progress for
the United States to revert to a legal regime that enables officials to
silence their critics,
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Especially positive is the increasing counterspeech we have been
hearing from members of groups who have been disparaged by "hate
MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS
speech," as well as from many other community members and leaders· Th'is nsmg
· · resistance
·
to hateful words and deeds through the
Violent and discriminatory conduct must be swiftly punished, and
force of free speech-while also resisting the force of either censpeech conveying discriminatory, hateful ideas should be strongly
sorship or violence-has been encouragingly evident in the face of
rebutted. But punishing ideas we consider hateful or discriminatory
demonstrations by "alt-right" and similar groups. We have witnessed
not only violates the fundamental free speech principles outlined
a remarkable and bipartisan outpouring of speech and peaceful demabove; it also may well increase intergroup distrust and discriminaonstrations that have denounced hateful ideologies and violence,
tion rather than reducing them. Evidence suggests that none of us is
and that have celebrated our nation's renewed commitments to
immune from "implicit" or unconscious biases that pervade our soci- ,
equality, inclusivity, and intergroup harmony. This counterspeech
ety, with its entrenched structural discrimination. Therefore, speech
chorus reaffirms the First Amendment's essential role in promoting
that reflects discriminatory stereotypes can often result from ignothese fundamental goals.
rance or insensitivity rather than malevolence. Of course, we must
vigorously combat bias, including of the unintended variety. But the
tools for doing so should be calibrated appropriately. Someone who
negligently conveys stereotyped views is likely to respond more positively to constructive educational outreach than to accusations of
and punishment for "hate speech." Indeed, as I discuss in Chapter 8,
even for people who consciously harbor and express hateful views,
educational strategies are more promising than censorship for altering such views and curbing their influence.
Just as "hate speech" and bias crimes are, alas, abounding, so too
are resources for countering them, with a wealth of information, training, and organizations that empower all of us to speak up both for ourselves, if we are disparaged, and for others whom such speech targets.
Also abounding are non-censorial measures for curbing the potential
harm to which constitutionally protected "hate speech" is feared
to contribute: discrimination, violence, and psychic injuries. The
recently emergent interdisciplinary field of "hate studies" explores
these kinds of non-censorial interventions, and human rights activists
around the world have advocated increased reliance on them.
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